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In the 1990s, Italian women gave birth to an average of 1.1 to 1.2children – the lowest birthrate of any country in the world and“likely the lowest ever documented in the history of humanity for a
large-scale population.”1 The Italian government worries that its na-
tion’s birthrate is “too low”,2 and the media repeat these worries. One
women’s magazine wrote of “demographic desertification”; a national
daily newspaper described Italy as a nation that is “old and without
babies,” while another juxtaposed “empty cradles” with a growing
“immigrant supply.”3 A cartoon in a June 1997 news magazine echoed
the national mood, commenting that:
“Italians don’t want to have children anymore. They want to be
free to screw around without too many explanations”.4
In November 2002, Pope John Paul II described the “crisis of births”
as a grave minaccia, or serious threat that weighs on the future of
Italy.5
Concerns about ageing proliferate alongside those about the low
birthrate. The fact that Italians are living longer is constantly in the
news. Men live 76.8 years on average and women 82.5 years.6 A July
1997 article entitled “Italy? It is old and without children” described
the country as having become “the oldest country in the world, a country
of great-grandparents.”7
For some, this trend spells demographic “upset” in terms of the
proportions of young and old. In 1950, there were 16.4 million Ital-
ians under 20 compared to 5.7 million people over the age of 70.
Statisticians predict that by the year 2030, the proportions will invert:
there will be just 6.2 million youths and 18.7 million seniors.8
 A 2003 BBC report entitled “Ageing Europe is unprepared” pro-
vided one worrying statistic after another for Italy: a village with four
births for every 14 funerals; predictions of a 1:1 ratio of productive
worker to pensioner by the year 2050 in a population that had dwin-
dled from 56 to 40 million. It warned:
“When the muscular superpower across the Atlantic continues
to enjoy steady population growth, old man Europe is in danger
of becoming a shrivelled shadow of its former self. When will
Europeans wake up to the implications of consistently low birth
rates? Well, in the words of one European professor of popula-
tion studies, probably not until they are all in their wheelchairs
and they suddenly realize there is no one left to push.”9
The US weekly opinion magazine New Republic predicted that “Italy
will be a theme park in a couple of generations.”10 In the early 1990s,
a young man told the author that if Italians didn’t start having more
1. Golini, A., De Simoni, A. and Citoni, F.,
(eds.), Tre scenari per il possibile sviluppo
della popolazione delle regioni italiane
al 2044 [Three Scenarios for Possible
Population Development for Italy’s Re-
gions up to 2044], Consiglio Nationale
delle Ricerche, Istituto di Ricerche sulla
Popolazione, Rome, 1995, p.1.
2. Population Reference Bureau, 2001 World
Population Data Sheet. http://
www.prb.org, accessed 15 June 2002. By
2005, Italy’s Total Fertility Rate had risen
slightly to 1.3 births per woman (PRB,
2005 World Population Data Sheet,
accessed 1 June 2006).
3. “Italia? Vecchia e senza bambini,” La
Stampa, 25 July 1997, p.17 (Thanks to
Massimo Bressan for this reference);
“Culle più vuote, l’Italia cresce solo per
l’apporto degli immigrati,” La Nazione,
27 June 1997, p.7.
4. L’Espresso, 26 June 1997. Thanks to
Luciana Fellin for this cartoon.
5. Itti Drioli, “Le ‘tavole’ del Papa
conquiestano il Parlamento,” La Nazione,
Quotiadano Nazionale, Prato, 15 Novem-
ber 2002, pp.3-5.
6. These life expectancies are just above the
2004 European Union average of 75 years
for men and 81 for women (Eurostat, “A
statistical view of the life of women and
men in the EU25,” 6 March 2006, p.2,
http://epp.eurostat.cec.eu.int, accessed 5
June 2006).
7. La Stampa, op. cit. 3.
8. Golini, A., Mussino, A. and Savioli, M.,
Il malessere demografico in Italia [The
Demographic Malaise in Italy], Il Mulino,
Bologna, 2000, p.8.
9. Sackur, S., “Ageing Europe is Unpre-
pared”, BBC News, 2 August 2003, http:/
/newsvote.bbc.co.uk, accessed 4 August
2003. Thanks to Milena Marchesi for this
reference.
10. Easterbrook, G., “Overpopulation Is No
Problem – in the Long Run,” New Repub-
lic, 11 October 1999, p.22.
2July 2006
The Corner House
Briefing 36: Dangerous Demographies
children, it would mean “the end of the Italian race.” In 1999,
ABCnews.com, quoting the Population Reference Bureau, calculated
that the last Italian would be born in the year 3880.
Intertwined with talk about births, deaths and ageing are comments
about the third point of the demographic triangle: migration. More
than a decade ago, then-Labour Minister Carlo Donat Cattin, in a
July 1990 interview with the news-magazine L’Espresso, called on
Italians to produce more babies “to keep away the armadas of immi-
grants from the southern shores of the Mediterranean.”11
In a way, this obsession with dwindling numbers of people is odd,
because since the middle of the twentieth century, it has been fears of
“overpopulation” rather than underpopulation that have dominated
popular, scientific and academic studies.12 One would expect that Italy
would now be held up as a model for other countries to follow. In-
stead, the demographic trend in Italy (and in other European and Asian
countries, such as Japan) is viewed with great concern. As I engaged
in ethnographic research in the Italian province of Prato during 1995-
1997 and subsequently, I have asked: How has a consensus been
achieved around the “problem of low fertility”?
Demographic Alarms and the
Scientific Manufacture of Fear
Worries about low birthrates, ageing and immigration, and the societal
consequences that are predicted to flow from them, can be traced
largely to demographic reports.13 Those by Italian demographers ex-
hibit several patterns, frequently straying from fact, figure or observa-
tion into the realm of opinion or comment.14 First, Italian demogra-
phers consistently describe the country’s birthrate as bassissima –
extremely low. For example, a book entitled Children of Italy noted
that the “birthrate has undoubtedly sunk to the lowest level in the
world”15 – the metaphor of sinking suggesting an undesirable process
in the context of the somewhat nationalist title.
Second, the reports all agree that this low birthrate constitutes a
serious problem. A report on Demographic Tendencies describes
the birth rate as:
“provoking in the population – quickly but silently – a true and
real ‘mutation,’ which has in itself the potential to unhinge the
whole social and economic structure of the country.”16
Similarly, the authors of an Atlas on Population Ageing classify de-
mographic trends as bringing about:
“rapid and profound transformations that have radically modi-
fied, and in some cases unhinged, the entire structure of the
whole society.”17
Renowned Italian demographer Antonio Golini and his colleagues have
gone so far as to posit an “excess” of low fertility18 and of pending
“deformations” in the age structure that they believe create a vulner-
able society, weakening its ability to meet the needs of its citizens for
services, buildings and jobs.19 They ponder the dangers that utterly
transformed generational ratios may pose to “adequate social cohe-
sion”.20 They push the idea that:
11. Quoted in Martiniello, M., and P. Kazim,
“Italy: two perspectives.” Race & Class
1991 32 (3): 79-89, p.88.
12. For example, Ehrlich, P., The Population
Bomb, Buccaneer Books, Cutchogue, NY,
1968; Meadows, D.H, et al., Limits to
Growth, University Books, New York,
1072 (updated as Meadows, D., et al.,
Limits to Growth: The 30-year Update,
Chelsea Green Publishers, White River
Junction, VT, 2004). Women’s activist
and critical US academic Betsy Hartmann
refutes their theories:“The main problem
is not that there are too many people and
too few resources, but that too few people
monopolize too many resources.”
(Hartmann, B., Reproductive Rights and
Wrongs: The Global Politics of Popula-
tion Control, South End Press, Boston,
1995, p.17.)
13. Demography is the scientific and statisti-
cal study of human populations, especially
its dynamics as reflected in fertility, mor-
tality and migration. Practitioners often
portray themselves as belonging to a neu-
tral, objective discipline, but historians
and cultural critics have described its po-
litical roots from its beginnings. See
Greenhalgh, S., “The Social Construc-
tion of Population Science: An Intellec-
tual, Institutional, and Political History
of Twentieth-Century Demography,” Com-
parative Study of Society and History ,
38(1), 1996, pp.26-66.
14. See Krause, E., “Empty Cradles” and the
Quiet Revolution: Demographic Discourse
and Cultural Struggles of Gender, Race,
and Class in Italy,” Cultural Anthropol-
ogy 16(4), 2001, pp.576-611.
15. Volpi, R., Figli d’Italia: Quanti, quali e
come alle soglie del Duemila [Children
of Italy: How, What and Why at the Dawn
of the Second Millenneum], La Nuova
Italia, Bagno A Ripoli (Firenze), 1986,
p.31.
16. Golini, A., (ed.) Tendenze demografiche e
politiche per la popolazion:. Terzo
rapporto IRP sulla situazione
demografica italiana [Demographic Ten-
dencies and Policies for the Population:
Third Report on the Italian Demographic
Situation], Il Mulino, Milano, 1994,
(original emphasis).
17. Lori, A., Golini, A. and Cantalini, B.,
(eds.), Atlante dell’invecchiamento della
popolazione [Atlas on Population Age-
ing], Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche,
Rome, 1995, p.1.
18. Golini, A., Mussino, A. and Savioli, M,.
op. cit. 8, p.7.
19. Ibid, p.98.
20. Ibid, p.99.
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“there should exist a ‘correct’ dose of numerical equilibrium
between the generations . . . to assure a harmonious individual
and collective development.”21
This logic should also “apply to the distribution of various types of
families.”22
Third, many demographers believe that the Italians responsible for
the low birthrate – those of childbearing age, and women in particular
– have become irrational. One demographic text opens by stating that
Italian procreative behaviours are “very far from [the] zero population
growth that good sense suggests.” Whereas some regions have “a
level of denatality never touched by another consistent population in
the world,” other regions have indices that are “sensibly higher”.23 The
book implies that people living in regions with low birthrates have lost
their senses.
Some demographers have gone further in predicting the conse-
quences of this demographic trend: the end of Italian culture. For in-
stance, Golini, in describing the “inescapable” ageing of the Italian
population, predicted the “death” of 400 Italian comune (counties)
within three decades. A comune must have a certain number of peo-
ple to be recognised as a legitimate governing entity; in quite a few
comune, particularly those in mountainous and isolated areas, the
population has declined.24 When challenged for waking up “the ghost
of Italian extinction”, he said:
“If we have a global view [of population], there is no problem.
If the Italian population declines quickly, the immigrants will ar-
rive and Amen. But we cannot stop at this. I study Mayan civi-
lization and just as I regret their disappearance, I can regret it if
the Italian or European culture were to disappear.”25
Golini implies that immigrants bring difference and hence pose dan-
gers to Italian national identity on the assumption that immigrants can-
not continue Italian civilization. His statement also assumes that Ital-
ians are the bearers of a unique humanism that only certain cultural
and genetic types can carry forth. After all, as a demographer he was
talking about births.
Implicit and Explicit Pronatalism
Scientific pronouncements from demographers that frame the low birth-
rate as a serious problem constitute “sneaky pronatalism” – an at-
tempt to entice people, particularly women, to have more children. In
general, however, Italian demographers have avoided advocating strin-
gent or overt pronatalist measures for several reasons. First, the shadow
of fascism still hovers over demographic science. Most contemporary
demographers want to distance themselves from the Italian fascist era
of 1922-1944 and its blatant pronatalist policies (see Box: A  Legacy
of Fascism, p.4).
Second, many demographers understand the connection between
women’s reproductive decision-making and their chances for
equal opportunities. They realise that a hard-line demographic policy
could dismantle societal gains over the past several decades towards
gender parity, particularly those related to education, employment,
21. Ibid, p.99.
22. Ibid, p.99.
23. Golini, A., “Introduction” in Palomba,
R., (ed.) Crescita Zero [Zero Growth],
La Nuova Italia, Scandicci (Firenze), 1991,
pp.vii, ix.
24. Before the Second World War, about 50
per cent of employed Italians worked in
agriculture, a figure that had declined ten-
fold by the 1990s to five per cent. Wide-
spread abandonment of the countryside led
to a sweeping decline in rural labour
(McCarthy, P., Italy Since 1945: The Short
Oxford History of Italy, Oxford Univer-
sity Press, Oxford, 2000, p.10.) In the
Tuscan province of Prato where I conducted
field research, people increasingly migrated
from the countryside after the War to eco-
nomic centres, initially for jobs but even-
tually for careers, higher education, and
urban lifestyles (see Krause, E., “Encoun-
ters with the ‘peasant’: memory work,
masculinity and low fertility in Italy,”
American Ethnologist  32(4), 2005,
pp.593-617).
25. “Allarme dei demografi: a causa della
natalità sotto zero spariranno centinaia di
cittadine italiane,” [“Demographic
Alarms: Due to the Below-Zero Birthrate,
Hundreds of Italian Towns to Disappear”],
L’Unità, 29 October 1996.
Worries about the
impacts on society
of low birthrates,
ageing and
immigration
can be traced to
demographic
reports.
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A Legacy of Fascism
Since the Second World War,
Italy has pursued a hands-off
national policy approach
towards reproduction (except
for Prime Minister Silvio
Berlusconi’s 2003 offer of 1,000
euros for a second child). This
is in sharp contrast to the
fascist era of 1922-1944.
Benito Mussolini launched
an intensive demographic
campaign in 1927, outlining his
plan in his 26 May “Ascension
Day” address to the Chamber of
Deputies – a speech deemed so
historic in its day that it was
translated and printed in full in
the New York Times. Mussolini
lamented the trend of declining
births in Italy. Between 1886 and
1926, births had dropped from
39 per thousand women of
childbearing age to 27. He
proclaimed that:
“a declining birthrate was a
symptom of disease and
decline.”1
“Population” had for some time
been an instrument for moni-
toring and managing the “social
body”.2 (Indeed, Italy’s first
nationwide census in 1861 had
coincided with the foundation of
the new Italian nation.3) But
Mussolini’s regime felt a special
political anxiety over Italy’s
future as a viable nation with a
vibrant civil society.
The fascist government thus
ran a bold campaign encourag-
ing couples to procreate for the
nation. Mussolini envisioned a
population increase from 40 to
60 million Italians by 1935 or
1940. The goals of fascist birth
politics were “social defence”
and multiplication: more boys
to serve as soldiers in Musso-
lini’s projected army of five
million strong; more subjects to
populate Italy’s peninsula as
well as its African colonies
(Eritrea, Somalia, Libya) and the
islands of the Aegean.
Reproduction was
reconfigured as a national duty.
Mussolini told his listeners:
“The fate of nations is
intimately bound up
with their powers of
reproduction.”4
The campaign eventually turned
to consensual as well as coercive
means. The programme taxed
bachelors; awarded prolific moth-
ers with “birth bonuses” and other
financial incentives; outlawed
abortion to the point of making it a
crime against “the race”; banned
contraceptives; and restricted
women’s access to employment.
In addition, statistics were
collected. Mussolini set up numer-
ous commissions and agencies to
monitor the population. The
Central Institute of Statistics
(ISTAT) was established in 1926 to
ensure that population statistics
rapidly developed as a field of
study.5 Emphasising the impor-
tance of statistical studies, Musso-
lini declared:
”Numbers do not govern
peoples, but especially in
modern societies, which are so
large and complex, numbers
are a necessary element for
whoever wishes seriously to
govern a nation.”6
Intensified statistical documenta-
tion contributed to the fascist goal
of exerting state control over
human activities to a degree never
before attained.
Nevertheless, Italians did not
submit passively to the regime’s
dictates. Oral historians and social
anthropologists have documented
Italians’ creative and prolific
resistance in snubbing Mussolini’s
attempt to control their bedroom
behaviour.7
The campaign had little observ-
able effect, and birth rates contin-
ued to decline. The average age at
marriage did not lower, nor did the
marriage rate increase. The most
popular contraceptive technique at
the time, withdrawal, was acknowl-
edged to be beyond the scope of
effective regulation, while condoms
continued to be made available for
public health reasons (although
socially stigmatised), particularly
to soldiers. Nonetheless, poverty
and the lack of effective contracep-
tion led many women to seek
abortion. Legislation banning the
distribution of information on
contraception and abortion re-
mained in place until the 1970s,
and abortion in Italy was legalised
in 1978.
In the 1930s, Mussolini and the
fascist press regularly acknowl-
edged the “failure” of his campaign
as demographic decline reached
“catastrophic velocity”. In
December 1933, he said:
“Until a few years ago, it
could be said that the
Italians were a people
without space; in a few
years, it will be said that
instead there is a space,
but the people are
lacking”.8
1. Mussolini, B., “Full Text of
Mussolini’s Speech Outlining
His Plans for a Greater Italy:
His Vision of Power Put into
Words,” The New York Times,
29 May 1927, pp. 12-13. See
also Horn, D. G, Social Bodies:
Science, Reproduction and
Italian Modernity, Princeton
University Press, Princeton NJ,
1994, pp.46-47 and p.49.
2. See Foucault, M., The History
of Sexuality (Volume 1),
Vintage Books, New York,
1978, pp.139-141.
3. See Livi-Bacci, M., A History of
Italian Fertility, Princeton
University Press, Princeton,
1977, pp.8-11.
4. Mussolini, B, op. cit 1 , p.12.
5. de Grazia, V., How Fascism
Ruled Women, Italy, 1922-
1945, University of California
Press, Berkeley, 1992, p.48;
Horn, D., op. cit. 1, p.14.
6. Mussolini, B., “Il discorso
dell’Ascensione [The Ascension
Day Speech, 26 May 1927], in
Susmel, E. and Susmel, D.,
(eds.), Opera omnia di Benito
Mussolini, Vol 22, La Fenice,
Florence, 1927, p.361, quoted
in Horn, D. G, op. cit. 1,
pp.46-47.
7. For details on this history, see
Passerini, L., Fascism in
Popular Memory: The Cultural
Experience of the Turin
Working Class, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge,
1987; Schneider, J.C. and P.T.
Schneider, “Sex and Respect-
ability in an Age of Fertility
Decline: A Sicilian Case Study,”
Social Science Medicine 33(8),
1991, pp.885–895; Krause,
E.L., “Forward vs. Reverse
Gear: The Politics of Prolifera-
tion and Resistance in the
Italian Fascist State,” Journal
of Historical Sociology  7 (3),
1994, pp.261-288.
8. Mussolini, B., “Cifre” in
Susmel, E. and Susmel, D.,
(eds.) Opera omnia de Benito
Mussolini, Vol 26, La Fenice,
Florence, 1934, pp.124-5,
p.125, quoted in Horn, D. G,
op. cit. 1, p.156.
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reproductive rights, sexual health, parental leave and family matters.26
Concern over gender issues is apparent in a draft demographic
report on the quality of life in Tuscany, which called for innovation in
policy to address issues of “sustainability with regard to the family as
well as maternity”, yet cautioned against “damaging or undermining
civil liberties” owed to single people and, in particular, to women. The
hesitation in making specific policy proposals results from respect for
family privacy, explains Italian anthropologist Massimo Bressan. “The
state should not heavily intervene in such choices.”27 Such policies are
hard to make without raising the hackles of those who care about civil
liberties and individual freedoms.
Nonetheless, political and social interest in family matters has no-
ticeably revived in the past decade. Italy’s former Minister for Social
Affairs, Livia Turco, called for the family to be placed at the centre of
public policies. She noted that:
“between 1996-1999, family policies were planned as a great
battle of culture and values arising from our awareness of the
need [to invert the] trend [of] sterile familialism that has distin-
guished the last 50 years, during which the Italian family has
been left alone to bear the burden of all the social and economic
changes.”28
Yet social scientist Giovanni Sgritta observes that family policies and
the welfare system have not risen to the task of resolving problems,
such as forecast pension shortages attributed to the demographic situ-
ation.29
Nationalism and Chauvinism
Despite this reluctance to recommend or implement pronatalist poli-
cies, a strong statement on population policy appears in the book,
The Demographic Malaise in Italy.30 Golini and his demographer
colleagues call for a dual strategy that combines more immigrants with
more new-borns to lessen, even if not prevent, the negative impacts of
the inevitable changes in the country’s age structure.
The current rate of immigration into Italy of about 80,000 to 100,000
new foreign residents per year could contribute “substantially to the
demographic balance of the Italian population in the next few years,”
according to Golini and his colleagues.31 In part, their projections as-
sume that immigrants would not immediately assume the reproductive
behaviours of Italian couples – in other words, that they would on
average have more than one child. Golini predicts that the “immigrant”
population would eventually climb from 2.6 per cent to 10.3 per cent
of Italy’s total population.
But the researchers caution that relying heavily on immigrants to
“fill the demographic void” is risky. In the few years since Italy has
been registering immigrants, their presence “has already created some
social tensions to the point of manifesting rejection.”
Thus they opt for augmenting the birthrate as the primary strategy
to create a more viable and hence “normal” population structure. These
demographers suggest that a successful scenario would require a fer-
tility increase from a rate of 1.1-1.2 to at least 1.7-1.8 births per
26. Comparative assessments of gender par-
ity across cultures and epochs raise vex-
ing problems and risk reproducing stereo-
types of Italian gender relations. More-
over, equal opportunities to work do not
eliminate discrimination, nor do official
counts of women participating in the
workforce illuminate the recent or long
history of women working for pay in hid-
den sectors of the economy. Nevertheless,
among students born between 1952 and
1967, women surpassed men in terms of
university degrees as well as high school
diplomas (Schizzerotto, A., “La scuola è
uguale per tutti?” in Ginsborg, P. (ed.),
Stato dell’ Italia, il Saggiatore, Bruno
Mondadori, Milano, 1994, pp.558-562).
Divorce was legalised in 1970 and abor-
tion in 1978. The 1975 family rights law
promoted equality between husband and
wife, eliminating the legal position of the
husband as head of the household. In prac-
tice, these changes threatened patriarchy
but have not eliminated it. See Krause,
E., “Italy,” in Walter, L., (ed.) The Green-
wood Encyclopedia of Women’s Issues
Worldwide: Europe, Greenwood Publish-
ing Group, Westport, CN, 2003, pp.341-
372.
27. E-mail communication from Prato-based
economic anthropologist Massimo
Bressan, 14 January 2003.
28. Quoted in Sgritta, G. B., “The Situation
of Families in Italy in 2001”, European
Observatory on the Social Situation, De-
mography, and Family, 2001, http://
europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/
eoss/index_en.html, accessed 15 May
2003, p.9.
29. Ibid.
30. Golini, A., Mussino, A. and Savioli, M.,
op. cit. 8.
31. Ibid, p.101.
Constantly
describing low
birthrates as
problematic is
“sneaky
pronatalism”
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woman. To translate those averages into reality would require many
more women to have two and three children, and many fewer women
to have just one child or none at all. Indeed, the authors say, the most
significant change would have to come in the number of women with-
out any children: a decrease from the current estimate of 23 per cent
down to 14 per cent. Another proportion of women – those with
three children – would have to move up from the current 13 per cent
to 21 per cent. Less dramatic, but still noteworthy, is that at least one
per cent of mothers would need to have four or more children. Finally,
this scenario would call for the number of women who have only one
child to move from the current level of 29 per cent to 26 per cent.
Golini and his fellow demographers offer no concrete policy ad-
vice on how to realise their scenario – and ultimately admit that it is
“impossible.” It seems highly unlikely, for example, that nearly two out
of three of the 36 per cent of women who have two children would
procreate a third.
Instead, they explain why they think Italian women will not
have more children. First, women have their first child increasingly
later in life and hence do not feel they have enough time – physio-
logically, psychologically and professionally – to have a second, let
alone a third. Second, in Italian society, “the interests of women
are intrinsically at odds with the interests of babies and with the popu-
lation”. The demographers portray the demographic crisis as the
manifestation of a:
“profound and generalised crisis of values that all but supports
procreative choice: as far as people have become individuals –
women in particular but not only women – and couples . . .
remain imprisoned within the play of social pressures and the
drive toward individualism.”32
The primary focus on women in these discussions of demographic
engineering reproduces the dominant and long-standing notion that
women are the main source of population problems. But there is a
“scientific” reason for this focus: demographers calculate fertility rates
from women only. Maternity is certain, paternity is not.33
Racism Clothed as Culture
The lack of neutrality in numerous demographic reports is startling.
Judging by these Italian reports, demographers not only crunch num-
bers but also make moral judgements that bespeak of core values,
assert their interpretations as unquestionable truths, and make fore-
casts that ooze with assumptions about a normal, healthy society: the
nuclear family as a product of nature rather than a construct of cul-
ture;34 the couple as a procreative unit; the woman as mother; national
population being solely women’s responsibility; and protected sex and
planned offspring as the rational norm.
Demographers have thus contributed significantly to societal atti-
tudes toward family-making and family size. To state that women’s
interests are at odds with those of babies is to stake out a moral ground
on which women’s primary role is as biological reproducer for the
nation – much as it was during the fascist years.
32. Ibid, pp.102-104.
33. Furthermore, the mothers of adopted chil-
dren are not included in fertility rates;
rather, it is the biological mother’s birth
of that child that is counted.
34. Golini et al., op. cit. 8, pp.7, 98, 99.
The demographic
focus on women
reproduces the
notion that
women alone
create population
problems but
not men.
Demographic
reports are not
neutral but make
moral judgements
and normalising
assumptions.
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Furthermore, the women in question are clearly not immigrants but
Italian nationals who are white Europeans. The alarms that demogra-
phers have sounded about the low birth rate rarely strike direct racial
chords – yet racial intonations can be heard if one listens closely. While
demographers are often silent on the subject of race and like to ap-
pear objective, their silence can mask the effects that their alarmist
claims have on racist feelings and actions.
Race scholars acknowledge that while the terms of racism have
changed, racism still matters albeit in new ways. As sociologists John
Solomos and Les Beck have observed, race today is often “coded as
culture.” In a 2002 review essay, Paul Reitter explains what this means:
“The structures of racist ideology remain operative . . . but they
now stigmatize cultural – not specifically racial – groups as in-
nately deficient and dangerous.”35
Bodies once discriminated against through naked racialising discourses
are now clothed in cultural discourses that have powerful and harmful
stigmatising effects.
An exchange during a 2002 convention involving young Italian en-
trepreneurs illustrates this. Economic Minister Giulio Tremonti pub-
licly disagreed that immigration might reverse problematic population
trends because it “doesn’t resolve the pension problem, nor does it
right the demographic curves.” He invoked cultural reasons for his
objections: “I have nothing against couscous, but I really favour
pesto.”36 His linguistic choices are not accidental: couscous can be
interpreted as a symbol for Muslims, pesto for Italians, particularly
those from the North. Demographic data clearly shaped his opinions.
Demographers’ alarms assist in constructing and normalising Ital-
ians as homogenous, “white” and European. They enable racism by
promoting a politics of difference that heightens whiteness, not as an
objective skin colour but as a subjective ideology. This ideology func-
tions as an instrument of power by guaranteeing and naturalising privi-
lege.37 Furthermore, alarmist discourses encourage a form of demo-
graphic nationalism in which the national population is depicted at risk
from internal sources – low fertility and rapid ageing – as well as from
external ones – increasing immigration.38
In the contemporary era, respectable elites tend to avoid making
explicitly racist statements. Instead, they frequently use cultural differ-
ences to justify why they regard immigration as a threat. Regrets about
Italy’s impending cultural death, attributed to increasing numbers of
immigrants who bring different cultures, arguably mask but encourage
racist feelings. Revised racist ideology relies on undesirable cultural
attributes to depict certain groups as dangerous.
Although Golini and his colleagues maintain they do not approve of
rising intolerance against migrants, their argument increases it. For in-
stance, in describing the processes of integration of migrants into Ital-
ian society, they write: economic integration is normally fast; logistic
integration (such as home and school) is medium-long; and socio-
cultural and political integration is long to very long. This characterisa-
tion takes for granted stereotypes of an old-world society resistant to
change and fearful of difference. It reinforces conservative, xenopho-
bic notions in which racism is “coded as culture” and not based on
some supposedly objective somatic or visual “black-white” differences.
35. Reitter, P., “Racism: Coded as Culture?”
The Nation (October 28), 2002, available
at http://www.thenation.com/doc/2002
s1028/reitter, accessed 7 June 2006. See
also Beck, L. “The New Technologies of
Racism,” in Goldberg, D. and Solomon,
J., (eds.), A Companion to Racial and
Ethnic Studies, Blackwell Publishers Inc.,
Malden, MA, 2002, pp.365-378.
36. Ippolito, R., “Gli immigrati non sono un
viagra.” La Stampa, 9 June 2002, p.10.
37. In 2003, I went to California where I came
upon an exhibition at the Laguna Art Mu-
seum, Whiteness: A Wayward Construc-
tion. California is the first US state in
which whites are now the minority. “White
privilege and presumption,” wrote David
Roediger in the exhibit catalog, “often
operate as unnoticed, as if they were natu-
ral”. See Roediger, D. R., “ ‘I Came for
the Art’: Exposing Whiteness and Imag-
ining Nonwhite Spaces” in Stallings, T.,
(ed.) Whiteness: A Wayward Construction,
Laguna Art Museum, Laguna Beach, Cali-
fornia, and Fellows of Contemporary Art,
Los Angeles, 2003, p.53.
38. It is important to remember that people or
populations occupy territories or physical
space. Italian piazzas, for instance, can
change dramatically as new populations
come to frequent them, be they vendors,
immigrants or tourists. The norm of white-
ness only becomes apparent when poten-
tial “invaders” threaten to transform places
into non-white spaces. Demographic
alarmism creates a raucous noise that gives
legitimacy to white public space. See Hill,
J. H., “Language, Race, and White Public
Space”, American Anthropologist 100(3),
1998, pp.680-689; Page, E., “No Black
Public Sphere in White Public Space:
Racialized Information and Hi-Tech Diffu-
sion in the Global African Diaspora”, Trans-
forming Anthropology 8(1&2), 1999,
pp.111-128.
Racism clothed
as culture can be
just as  harmful
and stigmatising
as that based on
skin colour.
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Alarm Over European Demographic Trends
Ultimately, Golini and his associates fail in their attempt to occupy a
neutral, “objective” ground. While they suggest that it is up to “the
hosting society to embrace the immigrants and treat them like citi-
zens,” they also sound alarms about the existence of structured “limits
to immigration”.39
In sum, demographers’ constructions of social reality help to legiti-
mise a process of rallying behind a white, European racial identity.
Their narratives reveal the simultaneous cultural and biological foun-
dations of racist agendas.
Panic Over Immigrants
The demographers’ alarms of sub-replacement fertility levels and coded
racism have not stayed within demographic science: they reverberate
loudly in the media and popular culture and among other influential
elites in Italian society, encompassing journalists, politicians, corporate di-
rectors, academics and other scientists. All these discourses reproduce
racism, racist ideologies, and racially based social hierarchies.40
39. Golini et al., op. cit. 8, pp.101-102.
40. van Dijk, T. A., Elite Discourse and
Racism, Sage Publications, London, 1993.
All over Europe, demographic
trends attract negative press.
When Spain’s fertility rate
reached 1.1 in 2001, it was said
to be the lowest national
average in Western Europe. In
Sweden, Germany and Greece,
the total fertility rate in 2001
was 1.4 births per woman on
average, according to the World
Health Organization.1
That same year, a billboard
advert in Sweden featured
businessmen speaking into
microphones at what looked like
a press conference and wearing
lapel badges with the dictum
“Fuck for the Future”. The
badge’s yellow letters on a blue
background, the colours of the
Swedish flag, also resembled
the European Union emblem.
The image was actually part
of an advertising campaign for
Swedish tennis star Björn Borg’s
line of designer underwear. The
phrase “Drop your pants or
drop dead” may have been a
tactic to sell more underwear,
but it also reflected a regional
mood about low reproductive
rates.
The ad campaign, moreover,
featured white men only. The
visual white dominance serves
as a reminder that population
politics are also racial and gender
politics.
Panic over declining fertility
rates has travelled from West to
East. As of 2005, a line-up of
Eastern European nation-states
tops the US Population Reference
Bureau’s list of the lowest-fertility
countries in the world: Belarus,
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Czech Repub-
lic, Moldova, Poland, Slovakia,
Slovenia and Ukraine. (Also in the
top-ten are South Korea and
Taiwan.) Each of these countries
tallies a 1.2 “lifetime births” per
woman.2
In Russia, President Vladimir
Putin received international news
coverage in May 2006 when he
announced the country’s primary
concern as “love and motherhood”
– and offered women the financial
incentive of about $10,000 for their
second child so as to augment the
nation’s birthrate.3
This figure dwarfs the amount
Italian Prime Minister Silvio
Berlusconi began offering women
in 2003: a baby bonus of 1,000
euros ($1,000) to European or
Italian citizens who gave birth to or
adopted a second child.4 But the
policy hit a snag in April 2006.
Berlusconi sent a letter to all
parents of newborns just before the
national elections with best wishes
and instructions on how to collect
the bonus. Among the recipients
were some immigrant families
ineligible for the cash. The
Economy Ministry reportedly asked
the non-citizen families to return
the money.5
Implosion or
Ideology?
As these alarms of implosion echo
around the world, what ideological
conflict do they signal? Consider
that population politics impinge on
immigrants even in places where
national fertility rates would seem
to provide less fuel for paranoia,
for example, the United States,
which has a total fertility rate of 2.1.
Former presidential candidate
and conservative Patrick Buchanan,
in his 2002 best-selling book,
Death of the West, cites Europe as a
cautionary tale:
“The death of the West is
not a prediction of what is
going to happen, it is a depic-
tion of what is happening now
 . . . . Outside of Muslim Alba-
nia, no European nation is
producing enough babies to
replace its population.”
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In particular, alarmist approaches to demographic trends stimulate
a climate of fear and anxiety toward immigrants. For instance, con-
cerns expressed in media and other reports over the future of the
Italian nation posit a causal relationship between the increasing num-
bers of immigrants in Italy and the declining birthrate. Consider a 1997
headline from La Nazione: “Cradles emptier, Italy grows only due to
the immigrant supply.” The article suggests that international immigrants
have a major impact on the Italian population, even though a close
reading of the data indicates that as many Italians migrated out of Italy
in the 1990s as non-Italians entered the country. While the contribu-
tion of foreigners to population growth “is very modest”,41 immigrants
are nevertheless often seen as a demographic threat and as “taking
over” Europe.
Such media coverage of demographic trends consistently depict-
ing immigrants in a negative light contributes to feelings of public panic.
It invariably contrasts reasonable, rational Italians with irrational, out-
of-control non-Europeans, who are described by means of threaten-
ing metaphors, such as “invaders”. Anxious sentiments and negative
reports of the newcomer population are commonplace: 41. Golini et al., op. cit. 8, p.9.
His political agenda is to incite
panic in his readers. He warns:
“The First World has to turn
this around, and soon, or it will
be overwhelmed by a Third
World that is five times as
populous and will be ten times
as populous in 2050.”
His overarching project is to
prevent the decline of a white
population – particularly those who
are Christian, conservative, protec-
tionist and anti-immigration. He
positions these people as heirs to a
mythical, unified European legacy,
writing against those segments of
society who are socially tolerant
and secular. His opponents are the
socialist state and women who have
“given up” on bearing and raising
children.6
Similar fears appear on the
front pages of major US news-
papers. Declining birthrates have
become newsworthy, and the trend
receives consistent alarmist
reportage. In December 2002, New
York Times reporter Frank Bruni
described the birth rate trend as an
“increasingly worrisome reality for
Italy and other European countries
whose fertility rates have plum-
meted over the last decades.” He
described a worsening situation in
which the “slow-building conse-
quences are coming into starker
relief” as European countries:
“address the specter of sharply
winnowed and less competitive
work forces, surfeits of retirees
and pension systems that will
need to be cut back deeply.”
His descriptions reinforced the
notion of Europe as a dying
continent. For instance, looking at a
playground in Ferrara, Italy, filled
with children and adoring parents,
Bruni found “something wrong with
the picture. Most of the parents
were gazing at one, and only one,
child.”7
Another doom-and-gloom
report appeared in a 1998 New
York Times article entitled “Popula-
tion implosion worries a graying
Europe,” which framed low fertility
as an “epidemic.” Reporter Michael
Specter located the etiology of this
epidemic in women’s practice of
“choosing work and education over
having children.”
The article described birthrates
in many countries as being “in a
rapid, sustained decline. Never
before – except in times of plague,
war and deep economic depression
– have birthrates fallen so low, for
so long.”8
Exposing the nationalist demo-
graphic discourses as born out of a
politics of fear might enable space
for an anti-racist, counter-politics
of inclusion to open up.
1. Bruni, F., “Persistent Drop in
Fertility Reshapes Europe’s Future,”
The New York Times, 26 December
2002, p.A1.
2. Population Reference Bureau, 2005,
World Population Data Sheet,
http://www.prb.org, accessed 1
June 2006. Italy and Spain’s
rates have risen slightly to a
national average of 1.3 births
per woman, according to the
PRB’s statistics.
    The demographic situations of
ten countries in Euope are
presented in Douglass, C., (ed.)
Barren States: The Population
Implosion in Europe, Berg,
London, 2005. Included are
Norway, Germany, Russia, Czech
Republic, Bulgaria, Greece, Italy,
Spain, France and Ireland. For
China, see Greenhalgh, S., and E.
Winckler, Governing China’s
Population: From Leninist to
Neoliberal Biopolitics, Stanford
Univesrity Press, Standford,
2005.
3. Erofeyev, V., “Putin’s Baby
Love,” The New York Times, 20
May 2006, p.A13.
4. Fraser, C., “Italian women shun
‘mamma’ role,” BBC News, 27
March 2006, http://
news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/
europe/4739154.stm, accessed 1
June 2006.
5. Lee, Y., “Italy Seeks Return of
‘Baby Bonus’ from Immigrant
Families,” All Headline News, 22
April 2006, http://
www.allheadlinenews.com,
accessed 1 June 2006.
6. Buchanan, P. J., Death of the
West: How dying populations
and immigrant invasions imperil
our country and civilization, St.
Martin’s Press, New York, 2002.
7. Bruni, F., op. cit. 1.
8. Specter, M., “Population
Implosion Worries a Graying
Europe”, The New York Times, 10
July 1998, p.A1.
Alarmist
approaches to
demographic
trends encourage
fear of immigrants.
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“ ‘The Senegalese wanted to kidnap my son,’ but the police
dismantled the house: In Turin, the psychosis of the immigrant.”42
“ ‘Casbah’ in the heart of Milan; 163 Asians are living in the
piazza.”43
“Stones and clubs: the anger explodes among blacks without
housing.”44
“War in the new ghetto: Immigrants against immigrants among
alcohol and knives.”45
“Immigration, a record in Prato: 33 clandestines for every 1000
inhabitants, nothing like it in Italy.”46
“Immigrants – disastrous hygienic-sanitary conditions; Three
Chinese workshops closed.”47
These headlines enable the dominant members of society to justify
their intolerance as inevitable and reasonable.48 For instance, one re-
sponse to the perceived threat to the Italian nation has been financial
incentive programmes, most locally or regionally based (until
Berlusconi’s baby bonus, see Box: “Alarm Over European Demo-
graphic Trends” p.8). They are designed to encourage more births –
but not of non-Europeans. In May 1999, one newspaper proposed
that the city of Milan should offer monthly payments of one million lire
(about $600) for each birth in the city, but only if the residents had
lived in the city for at least 15 years. The vast majority of first-genera-
tion migrants would have been unlikely to qualify for the subsidy.
Without presenting any evidence of actual immigrant birthrates, the
article declared that:
“In the shadow of the Madonna shrine are foreigners who con-
tinue to procreate while the Milanese, due to choice or eco-
nomic difficulty, seem always less enthusiastic to confront the
prospect of having a family.”49
Invoking the shrine calls attention to the fact that the newcomers were
likely to be Muslims rather than Catholics.50 Several years ago, a
prominent priest called for “the need to erect a Christian dike against
the Muslim invasion of Italy.”51 The panic over perceived immigrant
birthrates and the local policy designed to exclude a particular popu-
lation combined to give off a “racist odour”, said critics on the political
left.
In a less controversial but widely publicised programme, the mayor
of Laviano, near Naples, offered 10,000 euros ($10,000) for any
baby born in his village.52
North and South
Demographic discourses generated about non-European “others” are
also connected to the history of Italian racism. Golini’s regret about
the potential disappearance of “Italian” culture seems to leave out all
the differences, inequalities and historic racisms within Italy itself, fill-
ing in the resulting blank slate with descriptions of a homogenous
peninsula, constructed as the cradle of European civilization.
42. La Repubblica, 1 March 1990.
43. La Repubblica, 6 November 1990.
44. La Repubblica, 8 November 1990.
45. La Repubblica, 6 November 1990.
46. Il Tirreno, 12 November 2002.
47. La Nazione, 15 November 2002.
48. Over the past decade, Italy has tried hard
to rid itself of its “leaky frontier” image,
and to align itself with other European
Union countries in formulating a unified
policy on immigration. In January1990,
Italy’s first comprehensive migration
legislation, known as the “Martelli” law,
closed the country to further immigration.
According to the Migration Policy Insti-
tute, the law reflected “an attempt to con-
trol and monitor immigration and thus to
pave the way for the institution of a quota
system. It stipulated that any immigrant
– legal or illegal – who could prove that
he or she had come into the country before
the end of 1989 be granted a two year
residency permit” (http://www.migration
information.org/Profiles/print.cfm?ID=121,
accessed 18 May 2006).
  As of January 2001, Italy’s national sta-
tistics institute, ISTAT, tallied nearly 1.5
million resident (that is, legal) immi-
grants, representing just 2.5 per cent of
the country’s population of nearly 58 mil-
lion. By 2004, the figure had risen to 1.99
million non-nationals, or 3.4 percent of
the population, with Albanian citizens
being the largest group (“Non-national
populations in the EU Member States,”
Eurostat, No. 8/2006, http://
epp.eurostat.cec.eu.int/, accessed 6 June
2006). Most of Italy’s immigrants work
and live in the central and northern re-
gions of the country where their  labour is
increasingly needed, but public opinion
continues to associate immigration with
increased crime and poverty.
49. “Coppie milanesi, fate figli vi diamo un
milione al mese” [“Milanese couples, have
children and we’ll give you a million a
month”], La Repubblica, 5 May 1999,
p.30.
50. The most recent data available, 2004,
shows the majority of cittadini stranieri
(foreign citizens) as migrating to Italy from
Albania (316,659), Morocco (294,945),
Romania (248,849), China (111,712), the
Ukraine (93,441) and the Philippines
(82,625) (http://www.demo.istat.it/
str2004/index.html, accessed 6 June 2006).
51. A 2002 US Department of State Interna-
tional Religious Freedom Report noted
prominent Catholics “emphasizing the
perceived threat posed by immigrants to
the country’s ‘national identity’ and what
they view as the country’s need to favor
immigration by Catholics ‘or at least
Christians.’” The Report noted the June
2000 decision of the Italian Catholic
Church to tighten dispensation for Catho-
lics to marry Muslims. Its focus on the
“difficulties in Catholic-Muslim mixed
marriages” reversed Church policy of the
late 1990s when officials had organised
classes on Muslim world culture and tra-
dition in response to increasing interfaith
marriages. The Report also noted that hos-
tile comments towards Muslims intensi-
fied from late 2001 onwards: “[A] promi-
nent priest . . . warned that the New York
and Washington attacks were consonant
with ‘13 centuries’ of Muslim warfare
against Christians. Bologna Cardinal
Giacomo Biffi reiterated previous calls that
immigrants be selected for their ability to
11
July 2006
The Corner House
Briefing 36: The Scientific Manufacture of Fear
But the panic about immigrants has not induced all northern Italians to
put aside the prejudices they may have against southern Italians.53 On
the contrary, in the 1990s, long-standing sentiments against southern-
ers continued to simmer alongside rising anti-immigrant anxieties. Note
this comment from a sewing machine repairman to the author while
she was conducting fieldwork in a home-based sweater-finishing work-
shop in 1996 in Tuscany:
“Those weren’t Italians [who emigrated to the USA], they were
marocchini, little Moroccans. Down from Rome, they’re all
marocchini. They have more Arab blood. They don’t even
speak Italian.”54
The northerner’s comment not only marked southerners as non-Ital-
ians, but also constructed himself as a “real” Italian. His comment
defined so-called non-Italians as “matter out of place,”55 and thus
anomalous, polluting, even dangerous. His categories point to per-
ceived differences based simultaneously on biological and on cultural
attributes – differences that are viewed as intrinsic, immutable and
threatening. Demographic alarm-sounding reinforces both aspects of
racial differentiation.
Intolerance manifests itself more publicly in the xenophobic politi-
cal party Lega Nord, or Northern League, which has pushed a plat-
form that is both anti-immigrant and anti-southern. The party’s ulti-
mate goal of dividing Italy into two countries has relied on a rhetoric of
superiority and of old “us-versus-them” dichotomies: between “na-
tives” and immigrants, between padani (northerners) and marocchini
(southerners).56 One of the League’s proposals was to require that
extracomunitari, or non-European immigrants, ride in segregated train
cars, an idea the daily newspaper La Repubblica lambasted as “rail-
road apartheid”.57 Despite being extremists, the Northern League’s
political alliances gave it a legitimate voice in Italy’s government for
several years. In May 2001, national elections resulted in a five-party,
centre-right “Freedom House” coalition, which included Prime Minis-
ter Silvio Berlusconi’s party, Forza Italia, the National Alliance, the
Northern League, the Christian Democratic Centre, and the United
Christian Democrats.58
Irrational Sex
This anti-southern bias has long been related to the South’s relative
poverty (see Box: “Criminal Anthropology and Racial Formation”,
p.12). And poverty in southern Italy has in turn long been attributed to
high fertility, which, since the time of Malthus, has itself been regarded
as a sign of ignorance and moral bankruptcy and a justification for
policies designed to give the poor their just desert: starvation.
Because the birth rates of Europeans dropped so dramatically be-
tween the 1780s and 1950s (depending on region and socio-eco-
nomic class), a great deal of early and classical population theory de-
picted Europeans as “paragons of rationality, their minds disciplining
their bodies on behalf of long-range goals.”59 As people elsewhere
started controlling their fertility to similar degrees, they, too, joined the
march of progress to rational personhood. Having rational sex meant
integrate into Italian society, ‘integration’
being chiefly dependent on religious iden-
tity.” Within Italy, some political figures
repeated these sentiments, while others con-
tested them. Italian President Ciampi
warned against “drawing the wrong equa-
tion between Islam and terrorism” (http://
www.s t a t e . gov /g /d r l / r l s / i r f / 2002 /
13941.htm, accessed 7 June 2006).
52. In other rural areas, local administrators
have also offered economic incentives to
encourage births. See, for example,
Kennedy, F., “Italy offers families baby
cash,” BBC News, 1 December 2003;
Palmer, A., and B. Johnston, “Where have
all the babies gone,” Daily Telegraph, 18
April 2004.
53. The historical process of racial formation
has been well documented, particularly in
the US. See Ignatiev, N., How the Irish
Became White, Routledge, London, 1996;
Roediger, D., The Wages of Whiteness:
Race and the Making of the American
Working Class, Verso, London, 1991;
Sacks, K., “How Did Jews Become White
Folks?” in Gregory, S., and Sanjek, R.,
(eds.) Race, Rutgers University Press, New
Brunswick, NJ, 1994, pp.78-102.
    Whites from lower-socioeconomic strata
are also frequently racialised. See Hartigan,
J., Racial Situations: Class Predicaments
of Whiteness, Princeton University Press,
Princeton, 1999; Krause, E., “‘The Bead
of Raw Sweat in a Field of Dainty
Perspirers’: Nationalism, Whiteness, and
the Olympic Class Ordeal of Tonya
Harding,” Transforming Anthropology
(7)1, 1998, pp.33-52.
54. Author’s fieldnotes, 4 December 1996.
    Local accents and lexicons vary greatly
from region to region, even town to town,
particularly when social class is consid-
ered. When Italy was unified in 1861, Ital-
ian was mainly a literary language and spo-
ken by less than three per cent of the popu-
lation. Given the high number of languages
spoken throughout the peninsula, the gov-
ernment quickly established that “proper”
or “standard” Italian would be based on
the Florentine dialect spoken in most of
Tuscany. A national education system
gradually led to a decrease in variation in
the languages spoken throughout the coun-
try. But it was not until the 1960s, when
access to television became more wide-
spread that Italian became broadly known
and quite standardised (http://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Italy#Languages,
accessed 18 May 2006).
55. Douglas, M., Purity and Danger,
Routledge, London and New York, 1988
[1966] p.35.
56. Petrillo, A., “Italy: Farewell to the ‘Bel
Paese’[beautiful country]?” in Dale, G. and
Cole, M., (eds.) The European Union and
Migrant Labour, Berg Publishers, Oxford,
1999, p.245.
57. La Repubblica, 17 January 2003.
58. A centre-left coalition won the general elec-
tion in April 2006 by a narrow margin
(ht tp : / /www.s ta te .gov/ r /pa /e i /bgn/
4033.htm, accessed 7 June 2006).
59. Schneider, J. C. and Schneider, P. T., Fes-
tival of the Poor: Fertility Decline and the
Ideology of Class in Sicily, 1860-1980,
University of Arizona Press, Tucson, 1996,
p.5. See also Krause, E., A Crisis of Births:
Population Politics and Family-Making
in Italy, Wadsworth, Belmont, CA, 2005,
pp.68-72.
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that people were controlling their “animalistic” impulses. In demographic
parlance, women or couples having small families were “leaders” and
“modern”, while those still having large families were “laggards” and
“backward”. Nothing has more strongly divided populations into mod-
ern or backward than their procreative practices.
In Italy, the stigma associated with prolific child-bearing varied
regionally and socially. In the 1950s in Sicily, people in better-off classes
characterised the sexual endeavours of poor peasants as “the festival
of the poor.” A concern about the size of families was expressed as
“più famiglia, più fame” – more family, more hunger.60
Outsiders generalised this characterisation to the whole of south-
ern Italy in their portrayals. In 1958, for instance, US journalist and
food writer Samuel Chamberlain declared that:
60. Schneider, J. C. and Schneider, P. T.,
“Going Forward in Reverse Gear: Cul-
ture, Economy, and Political Economy
in the Demographic Transitions of a Ru-
ral Sicilian Town” in Tilly, L. A., Gillis,
J. R. and Levine, D., (eds.) The Euro-
pean Experience of Declining Fertility,
1850-1970: The Quiet Revolution ,
Blackwell, Cambridge, 1992, pp.156,
158.
The prejudice of many northern
Italian writers, policymakers and
public intellectuals towards their
southern compatriots intensi-
fied from 1861 onwards after
the formation of Italy as a single
nation.1
The process of uniting Italy’s
disparate kingdoms and city-
states, which had been inde-
pendent or under the control of
France, Austria or the Vatican,
was uneven.2 Unification largely
benefited the North, particularly
its textile, metal and mechanical
industries. It grew wealthy as the
agricultural South grew poor.
Italian political theorist Antonio
Gramsci, who first coined the
phrase La questione
meridionale, or “The Southern
Question”, observed:
“the North concretely was
an ‘octopus’ which enriched
itself at the expense of the
South, and . . . its eco-
nomic-industrial increment
was in direct proportion to
the impoverishment of the
economy and the agricul-
ture of the South”.3
The economic disparities
between North and South have
persisted ever since.4 In the late
1800s and early 1900s, the
South was populated with
malnourished and illiterate
people suffering from malaria,
filth, brutalities of feudal
servitude and the exploitations
of a tyrannical wealthy class.5
Rather than referring to
economic processes connected
to the politics of state forma-
tion, the dominant explanation
cited the innate racial inferiority
of southerners, who were con-
strued as naturally barbaric and as
biologically inferior.
Contributing to such explana-
tions were studies of criminal
anthropologists. In the 1870s, an
elite southern Italian physician,
Cesare Lombroso, developed a
theory of innate criminality. He
believed that criminals were born
bad, and that environmental factors
or historic circumstances were
irrelevant to the making of a
criminal. Crime was simply heredi-
tary. He used a “scientific” variable
dubbed “congenital Latin deca-
dence” to illustrate that men from
Calabria and Sicily were predis-
posed to crime.6
His theory wielded tremendous
influence on social thought and
judicial practice well into the 1900s
– and his ideas reinforced anti-
southern sentiments. Lombroso
served as an expert scientific
witness in criminal trials, pointing
out particular somatic features:
“outstanding ears, great maxillaries
and cheek bones . . . sinister look,
nose twisted to the right”.7
One of Lombroso’s adherents,
Alfredo Niceforo, published a book
in 1901 that compared northern
and southern Italians, aiming to
demonstrate the “fact” that there
were “two Italies” with “two races.” It
sought to substantiate the racial
inferiority – physical, psychological,
social and moral – of southern
Italians.
One of the strongest Italian
critics of the racial theory of
criminal anthropologists was
Gaetano Salvemini. “Race is formed
in history,” he wrote in 1899.
Salvemini pointed to uneven
economic conditions and develop-
ment as well as to forms of govern-
ance similar to colonialism to
explain the endurance of southern
poverty. The real cause did not rest
in the “blood of the southerners”,
he stated, but in the unfair system
of land ownership and class
immobility. He claimed that policies
and procedures favouring large
estate owners kept the poor
impoverished.
Today, southern Italy is one of
the poorest regions of the Euro-
pean Union in terms of per capita
income. Infant mortality in the first
28 days of life is 5.7 per 1,000 live
births, four times higher than in
the northern Italian provinces and
double the European average,
according to a September 2005 EU
study.8
Yet Gianfranco Miccichè, Italian
minister for the mezzogiorno, the
area of Italy south of Rome, points
to hopeful trends. Unemployment
levels have declined from an
average of 21 per cent in 2001 to
14 per cent.9
But inequities persist as do
stereotypes, some of which are
applied not just to the South of the
country but also to Italy as a whole.
For instance, The Economist
recently relied on age-old mod-
ernisation metaphors to describe
Italy as “caught in a long, slow
decline,”10 as “Europe’s laggard,”11
and as “structurally unsound.”12
More offensive were photo-
graphic captions. One photograph
accompanying an article about
economic woes in the South
showed a street full of clothes
hanging out on washing lines
between buildings on either side:
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“Sicily suffers from overpopulation and the poverty that goes
with it. The prodigious Italian faculty for producing progeny is
never better illustrated than here. What Sicily needs are more
fertile fields and fewer fertile women. Bambini positively
swarm.”61
Still just a little over 20 years ago, US anthropologist William A.
Douglass pointed out that:
“For the biased North Italian, the southerner is . . . given to
fathering broods of children, and unconcerned with personal
hygiene.”62
Such depictions of the Italian South and of southerners as prolifically
fertile are based on old stereotypes. Demographers Margarita Delgado
61. Samuel Chamberlain, Italian Bouquet: An
Epicurean Tour of Italy, Gourmet, New
York, 1958, p.463.
62. William A. Douglass, “Migration in Italy”,
in Kenny, M. and Kertzer, D. I., (eds.)
Urban Life in Mediterranean Europe: An-
thropological Perspectives, University of
Illinois Press, Urbana, 1983, p.182.
the caption, “Good at laundering”13
has a double meaning, given the
text’s discussion of organised-
crime groups in Italy.
Another photo complementing
an article entitled “Reform or die” –
characterising Italy’s economy as
“suffering from slow growth and a
steady deterioration of its competi-
tiveness” – depicted a group of
motorino riders with the caption
“Let’s go, but where?”.14
Both images and captions
reproduce stereotypes of disorder-
liness and chaos in southern
Europe.
Beginning with the postwar
boom, and especially in the 1960s,
numerous southerners moved
north for jobs. Upon arrival, they
faced harsh discrimination not
unlike that experienced by non-EU
immigrants today.15
Persistent put-downs of cultural
practices that differ from those of
northern Europe lend a perverse
legitimacy to Eurocentric logics of
racial and material dominance that
find their roots in old notions of
superiority.
1. After 1860, anything south of Rome
was increasingly represented as
“homogenous and inferior”
(Schneider, J.C, and Schneider, P.T.,
Reversible Destiny: Mafia,
Antimafia, and the Struggle for
Palermo, University of California
Press, Berkeley, 2003, p.40).
Eurostat lists eight regions of the
country’s 20 regions as comprising
this mezzogiorno: Abruzzi, Apulia,
Basilicata, Calabria, Campania,
Molise, Sicily and Sardinia.
2. For a definitive account in the
English language of politics in
modern Italy, see Mack Smith, D.,
Modern Italy: A Political History,
The University of Michigan Press,
Ann Arbor, 1997 (updated version).
3. Gramsci, A., Selections from the Prison
Notebooks, International Publishers,
New York, 1971, pp.70-71.
4. See Schneider, J.C., Italy’s “Southern
question”: Orientalism in One
Country, Berg Publishers, Oxford,
1998.
5. Teti, V., La razza maledetta: origini
del preguidizio antimeridionale
[The Damned Race: Origins of Anti-
Southern Prejudice], manifestolibri,
Rome, 1993, p.12.
6. Gibson, M., “Biology or Environ-
ment? Race and Southern ‘Deviancy’
in the Writings of Italian Crimi-
nologists, 1880-1920,” in  Schnei-
der, J.C, (ed.), op. cit. 4., pp.99-117;
Schneider, J.C., and Schneider, P.T.,
op. cit.1 , p.40.
7. Gould, S. J., The Mismeasure of
Man, W.W. Norton & Co., New York,
1981, p.138.
    Lombroso’s criminal anthropol-
ogy was part of a Western practice
of scientific racism. See Alland, A.
Jr., Race in Mind: Race, IQ, and
Other Racisms, Palgrave Macmillan,
New York, 2002; Baker, L., “A
Model Approach for Studying Race:
Provocative Theory, Sound Science,
and Very Good History,” American
Anthropologist, 106(1), 2004,
pp.168-172; Baker, L., and
Patterson, T., “Race, Racism, and
the History of US Anthropology,”
Transforming Anthropology
5(1&2), 1994, pp.1-7; Goodman, A.,
“Three Questions about Race,
Human Biological Variation and
Racism,” Anthropology News 46(6),
(September), 2005, pp.18-19; Holt,
T., The Problem of Race in the
Twenty-First Century, Harvard
University Press, Cambridge, 2002;
Horn, D. The Criminal Body:
Lombroso and the Anatomy of
Deviance, Routledge, New York,
2003; Lombroso, C., and Ferrero,
G., Criminal Woman, the Prostitute
and the Normal Woman, (translated
and introduction by Rafter, N.H.
and Gibson, M.,) Duke University
Press, Durham, 2004 (original
1894); Tucker, W., The Science and
Politics of Racial Research,
University of Illinois Press, Urbana
1994; Tucker, W., The Funding of
Scientific Racism: Wickliffe Draper
and the Pioneer Fund, University of
Illinois Press, Urbana, 2002.
    The 1930 penal code was partly
inspired by Lombroso’s work.
Abortion had been illegal since at
least 1889 as an attack on
individual life and the rights of
the fetus, relying on a determi-
nation that life begins at
conception. The penal code,
however, redefined abortion,
contraception and voluntary
sterilisation as “demographic
dangers”, as crimes against the
Italian “stock”, and as threats
to the nation and the state.
Bodily autonomy and the rights
of individuals were subordi-
nated to the demographic
interests of the nation (Horn,
D., Social Bodies: Science,
Reproduction and Italian
Modernity, Princeton University
Press, Princeton NJ, 1994,
pp.15-16, 82-84).
8. Nadeau, B., “Poor, Poorer,
Poorest”, Newsweek (interna-
tional edition), 26 Sept.-3 Oct.
2005
9. Unemployment rates vary
significantly by region,
according to Eurostat. In 2002,
the highest and lowest rates in
the South appeared in Sicily
(17.2%) and Abruzzi (7.9%)
whereas in the North they
occurred in Liguria (5.8%) and
Alto Adige (2.7%) (The Econo-
mist, “Addio, Dolce Vita: A
survey of Italy,” 26 November
2005, p.14).
10. The Economist, op. cit. 8.,  p.3.
11. Ibid,  p.4.
12. Ibid, p.6.
13. Ibid, p.17.
14. Ibid, p.18.
15. Carter, D., States of Grace:
Senegalese in Italy and the New
European Immigration, Univer-
sity of Minnesota Press,
Minneapolis, 1997; Cole, J., The
New Racism in Europe: A Sicilian
Ethnography, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge,
1997; Douglass, W. “Migration
in Italy,” in Kenny, M. and
Kertzer, D., (eds.) Urban Life in
Mediterranean Europe: Anthro-
pological Perspectives, Univer-
sity of Illinois Press, Urbana,
1983, pp.162-202; Krause, E., A
Crisis of Births: Population
Politics and Family-Making in
Italy, Wadsworth, Belmont, CA,
2005, pp.161-163, 172-174.
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Pérez and Massimo Livi-Bacci have written that, “Contrary to popu-
lar belief, Italy and Spain have never had very high levels of fertility.”63
Indeed, in the 1950s, when Chamberlain made his observations, the
total fertility rate in the United States – just over three children per
woman – was significantly higher than in Italy at just over two per
woman. A century earlier, between 1860-70, so-called natural fertility
levels among Italian and Spanish women were lower than those of
German, Dutch or Belgian women, and were about the same as those
of the English, Danish and Swedish. Nonetheless, travellers and ob-
servers like Chamberlain and his 19th-century predecessors:
“mistook the noisy presence of children in the streets . . . and
the active role they took in many rural and urban occupations
as signs of unusually high fertility”.64
But even demographers such as Livi-Bacci have attributed the cause
of the birth rate in southern Italy dropping later than in the rest of
Europe to the southerners’ clinging to tradition.65 His explanation, which
relied on aggregate statistics, reinforced notions of a backward South.
A significantly different picture emerges from village research con-
ducted by anthropologists Jane Schneider and Peter Schneider in Sic-
ily.66 Up until the late 1800s, having a large family in Sicily indicated
wealth. When agricultural markets collapsed at the beginning of the
1900s,67 the landed gentry was hard hit. To maintain their luxurious
lifestyle, elites had to change their ways. They embraced smaller fami-
lies. Their primary means of birth control was coitus interruptus.
Artisans and peasants experienced economic cycles differently.
Artisans began to have smaller families in the 1930s during the Great
Depression. The peasants – agricultural day labourers and sharecrop-
pers – were the most numerous class and actually increased their fam-
ily size up until the 1950s and 1960s when changes such as land re-
form led them to adopt coitus interruptus as well so as to limit births.
The Schneiders’ class-based analysis draws on demographic data and
local memory to reveal:
“interclass relations in the local community that created insur-
mountable obstacles to upward mobility for the braccianti
[sharecroppers and day labourers], and made it difficult for them
to construct and realize a new family ideal.”68
In a complex reading of the “social relations of domination and humili-
ation” during the inter-war period, the anthropologists describe a situ-
ation in which the wives and children of poor men “were not fully their
own, but in a dependency relation with padrone [the gentry bosses].”
Continuing to have large families – or rather a pregnant wife and a
new-born child – was a way for otherwise powerless men to affirm
their masculinity, albeit superficially.69
For each class, it was not that southerners suddenly broke with
tradition and rejected the customary values that marked them as “back-
ward”. Rather to realize the old value of respectability, they had to
make adjustments, such as limiting their fertility by means not only of
coitus interruptus but also of rhythm methods, barrier devices, herbal
remedies, abortions, and intensive and long-term breastfeeding. Some
couples also limited family size through traumatic means such as aban-
donment or infanticide.70
63. Delgado Pérez, M. and Livi-Bacci, M.,
“Fertility in Italy and Spain: The Low-
est in the World”, Family Planning Per-
spectives 24(4) July/August 1992, p.163.
Sicily’s total fertility rate (TFR) was
slightly higher than other regions but
well below non-Italian perceptions. It
went from 2.61 in 1975 to 1.70, a de-
cline of 34.9 per cent, compared to the
national rates of 2.18 to 1.31, a decline
of 39.9 per cent, during the the same 15-
year time span (p.164). The lowest rates
were in the northern region of Liguria,
which shifted from 1.65 in 1975 to 0.98
in 1990, a 40.6 per cent downward change.
The US Population Reference Bureau
defines Total Fertility Rate as “the aver-
age number of children a woman would
have assuming that current age-specific
birth rates remain constant throughout
her childbearing years (usually consid-
ered to be ages 15 to 49)” (http://
www.prb.org, accessed 1 June 2006).
64. Delgado Pérez, M. and Livi-Bacci, M.,
op. cit. 63, p.162.
65. Livi-Bacci, M., A History of Italian Fer-
tility ,  Princeton University Press,
Princeton, 1977.
66. Schneider, J.C. and Schneider, P.T., op.
cit. 59 and 60.
67. The collapse was due to capitalism’s
first depression spanning the 1890s to
the 1920s, when “drastically falling ce-
real prices and mounting tariff battles with
other countries destabilized not only
agrarian Sicily, but Italy as a whole. In
interior, latifundist [huge estate] towns
 . . .  members of the landed class man-
aged to stave off their own decline by
shifting the burden of contraction onto
their peasant sharecroppers and day
laborers” (Schneider, J.C., and Schnei-
der, P.T., “High fertility and poverty in
Sicily: Beyond the culture vs. rational-
ity debate,” in Greenhalgh, S., (ed.), Situ-
ating Fertility: Anthropology and De-
mographic Inquiry, Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, Cambridge, 1995, p.186).
68. Ibid, p.192.
69. Ibid, p.200.
70. On the history of abandonment in Italy,
see Kertzer, D., Sacrificed for Honor:
Italian Infant Abandonment and the
Politics of Reproductive Control, Bea-
con Press, Boston, 1993.
15
July 2006
The Corner House
Briefing 36: The Scientific Manufacture of Fear
Demographic Malaise?
By the 1990s, the demographic yardstick for distinguishing modern
from primitive reproductive behaviour no longer worked in Italy. Re-
production had become subject to a control that was itself seen as
“irrational”. It was viewed as having reached pathological extremes.
Livi-Bacci compared modern Italians’ refusal to procreate with
anorexics’ refusal to eat.71 His characterisation frames the reproduc-
tive activities of Italians as far from rational, because anorexia is a
debilitating, self-destructive disorder.
It is also very much a gendered disorder. Who is refusing to pro-
create if not women? (Recall, demographers calculate fertility rates by
studying groups of women.) The implication is that angst-ridden and
body-obsessed women are rejecting their responsibility to replenish
the nation. They have a disease. They have not become irrational like
their “inferiors”, but rather have been struck by a pathology that pre-
vents them from exercising their rationality.
This idea is echoed in the book by Antonio Golini and his col-
leagues, Il malessere demografico in Italia or The Demographic
Malaise in Italy.72 The term malessere is typically used with an ill-
ness; it is the opposite of well-being. It is generally used in reference
to the body, but its use in the book title points not only to individual
bodies but also to the social body – or more accurately the national
social body. The metaphor implies that the national social body is suf-
fering from a demographic illness. The authors turn a demographic
trend into a social pathology or a national disease.
In 1997, Minister of Health, Rosi Bindi, commented, “If the in-
crease in the life span is a conquest, the low level of natality is a sign of
lost civility or at least of tragic uneasiness.”73 Her alarm echoed that of
Golini that Italians’ reproductive outcomes in the past made them more
civilised. But was it not the very prolific reproductive patterns of south-
erners that marked them as backwards, and even stigmatised them as
marocchini, or Arab-like?
The bottom line of “demographic malaise” is the creation of fear:
fear of a future in which the old social and class structures of society
no longer exist; fear of vulnerability; fear of change; fear of a “de-
formed society”; and fear of immigrant others. Similarly, disappearing
but not mentioned are the culturally constructed justifications that pro-
tected social institutions such as the patriarchal family, the landed no-
bility and white northern Italians. “Demographic malaise” is not just
about a “deformation” in the age structure. It is also about waging a
politics of difference in an age of transnationalism.
Consequences of Alarm
The expert voices of demographers create a cacophonous alarm that
rings not only in the ears of Italians but also in the ears of immigrants.
The alarm ringing is about Italy as a nation and about Italy as part of
Europe: as Christian and as white. Demographic politics are racial
politics even when they are careful not to engage in vulgar racism.
In the current context of Europe, racism has become coded as cul-
ture. When politicians speak of “cultural difference”, they mask the
71. Livi-Bacci described demographers who
work on the topic of low fertility as being
“in the worrisome position of the doctor
faced with the case of an adolescent who
refuses food.” The loss of appetite, he rea-
soned, might just be due to social factors
that could be changed. But, in a worse-
case scenario, the loss of appetite was due
to an alteration of core values and hence
reflected “a true and real anorexia” (Livi-
Bacci, M., “Introduzione” in Golini, A.,
(ed), op. cit. 16, p.14).
72. Golini, A., Mussino, A. and Savioli, M.,
op. cit. 8.
73. La Stampa, op. cit. 3.
The bottom line of
“demographic
malaise” is the
creation of fear  –
of the future, of
change and
of Others.
“Demographic
malaise” is about
waging a
politics of difference
in an age of
transnationalism.
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practices of protecting white European privilege and perpetuating
exclusion.
Alarmist demographic discourses masquerade as objective science.
In reality, they constitute a strategy of subordination. Demographers
express fears of demographic desertification from a position of au-
thority, and their opinions give weight to those fears. Alarmist claims
about “demographic deformations” enable racism because they stimu-
late a climate of panic and anxiety towards immigrants. They fuel a
media environment in which the norm is to depict immigrants as a
threat.
Furthermore, as demographers speak with regret about a future
“disappearance” of Italians and of Italian and European culture, they
rewrite history. They encourage forgetting. They encourage a myth of
an Italy that was once “pure” and homogenous. Finally, such discourses
encourage some Italians to forget their history of internal racism when
united against external immigrants, but then slide back to it in other
contexts. The kind of prejudice that southern Italians experienced when
they moved north, particularly after the 1950s, is a reminder that Italy
has its own history of internal racism. The shadow of the “Southern
Question,” darkened by turn-of-the-last-century racist science, lin-
gers. Science gave credence to a view of southerners as deviant from
birth while ignoring other historical forces. This history lives on in preju-
dices against southern Italians whom northerners continue to dispar-
agingly refer to as marocchini, or Arab-like.
Scientific alarms about an ageing population imply that the country
is dying of a falling birthrate. This talk of national decay, as anthro-
pologists Susan Gal and Gail Kligman point out, is “a recurrent theme
of nationalist discourse all over Europe”.74 Italians – particularly women
– are depicted as pathological in terms of their sexual practices. Once,
Italians who embraced small families were held up as the paragons of
rationality. Now they are characterised as quasi- anorexics; instead of
refusing food, they are refusing procreation.
In sum, demographic discourses in the context of record low fertil-
ity in Italy pursue three principal strategies for manufacturing fear:
• disseminating tropes of nationalism that assume a “pure” and
homogenous population;
• constructing certain sexual and reproductive behaviours as polluting
what was once “pure”; and
• deploying scientific authority to give legitimacy to a “crisis”.
Demographers’ constant reiteration of the demographic “problem” of
the “crisis of births” or of demographic “unhinging” does not cultivate
sympathy or invite equality for immigrant populations. Immigrants un-
derstand who is implicated in this alarm-ringing. Cultivating a world of
open frontiers, open hearts and equal footing remains the work of
alternative initiatives whose shape is still emerging.
74. Gal, S., and G. Kligman, The Politics of
Gender after Socialism, Princeton Univer-
sity Press, Princeton, 2000, p.27.
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